Nigeria’s National Assembly has overcome party differences to address the country’s escalating insecurity in an uncommon show of solidarity. Lawmakers from the APC, PDP, and other parties gathered for intense discussions that resulted in audacious resolutions after a series of blatant kidnappings and assaults in late November 2025. In the midst of a crisis that has killed people, closed schools, and damaged public confidence, this moment may be a turning point—or a last-ditch appeal.
Senate President Godswill Akpabio unanimously approves the “Urgent Need to Address Escalating Insecurity” motion. Sen. Seriake Dickson (PDP, Bayelsa) criticizes “managed issues,” while Sen. Opeyemi Bamidele (APC, Ekiti) refers to it as a “turning point.” Key votes include classifying kidnapping and banditry as terrorism with the death sentence, investigating Kebbi’s departure, briefing service chiefs within a week, requesting intelligence from the United States and allies diplomatically, dissolving or reconstituting security committees, arming vigilantes, and reviewing gun rules for civilian ownership.
Triggering Incidents
Since November 17, at least 402 people—mostly schoolchildren—have been kidnapped in the states of Niger, Kebbi, Kwara, and Borno due to an increase in attacks in north-central Nigeria. On November 21, 253 students and 12 teachers were abducted from St. Mary’s Catholic School in Kebbi; on November 18, gunmen raided Christ Apostolic Church in Eruku in Kwara, killing two and kidnapping 38 worshippers (all of whom were later rescued); 24 girls were abducted from a school in Niger; and ISWAP ambushed and killed Brigadier-General Musa Uba and three soldiers in Borno. It was called a “shocking surge,” and the UN’s OHCHR called for responsibility.
During Senate President Godswill Akpabio’s plenary proceedings, the Senate and House crossed party lines for the first time in recent memory. Deputy Senate Leader Oyelola Ashiru (Kwara South, APC) introduced the “Urgent Need to Address Escalating Insecurity in Kwara, Kebbi, and Niger States” resolution, which was co-sponsored by members of both parties. A temporary NASS closure “until chaos ends,” according to lawmakers like Alhassan Doguwa (Kano, APC), was rejected by Senate Leader Opeyemi Bamidele (Ekiti Central, APC) as “abdication of duty.” Victims were remembered with a minute of silence.
The chamber defined abduction and banditry as terrorism, requiring revisions to the Terrorism (Prevention) Act that include the death penalty on conviction—no fines, no judicial reductions.
Additional directives include investigating the suspicious troop withdrawal in Kebbi 45 minutes prior to the raid, holding defense committee briefings within a week, disbanding and reorganizing security oversight committees, reaching out to the United States and its allies diplomatically for intelligence and technological support, bolstering vigilante groups, and reviewing firearm laws to permit responsible civilian ownership (as in more than 175 countries). Communities were asked to oppose “internal collaborators.”
Responses from the government and the public
On November 26, President Tinubu proclaimed a “security emergency” and ordered army increases and forest cordons while pushing NASS to legitimize state police. NMFAC ( Northern Muslims Forum Against Crisis) protests broke out at NASS gates, calling for student releases and solidarity beyond “tribe or religion.” Echoing Doguwa’s call for a shutdown, Northern Senator Ali Ndume demanded that NASS budgets be slashed to pay security. Some victims were released by rescue operations, while 314 are still in captivity.
A Crisis of Collusion and Collaps
These attacks are not isolated; rather, they indicate the spread of insurgents from Boko Haram/ISWAP strongholds southward, driven by drug cartels, weak borders, and purported security sabotage (e.g., Kebbi’s army withdrawal, according to Governor Nasir Idris). The UN estimates that 35 million people will experience acute hunger in 2026 as a result of displaced farmers; 15,000 people in Borno alone are expected to suffer from famine. The unity of NASS? If unsupported by action, it is performative; critics such as Peter Obi refer to Nigeria as a “disgraced country” whose elites value protection over patronage. However, the drive for the death penalty could backfire or dissuade extrajudicial killings in a system where convictions are uncommon (the EFCC secured more over 3,000 in 2024, but kidnappers frequently escape).
Political Theater or Pivot?
In a divided NASS (109 senators, 360 representatives, primarily APC/PDP), cooperation is new, but detractors perceive it as pre-2027 election posturing. Although Members of Parliament like Adams Oshiomhole acknowledge “progress” while calling for a “new approach” in light of population growth surpassing resources, Akpabio’s counterterrorism plan, which was unveiled on November 24, placed a strong emphasis on technology and partnerships. Tinubu’s support for state police could decentralize power, but federal opposition persists. According to World Bank estimates, economic uncertainty has increased investor flight and plane travel (road avoidance).
Although experts like HRW emphasize nonreligious roots (banditry for ransom), the diplomatic resolution of NASS was motivated by U.S. threats of intervention (related to “Christian genocide” accusations). Demands for elite sacrifice, such as Ndume’s budget cuts, are heightened by public indignation on X, such as calls for large-scale marches to Aso Rock. Failing here may lead to “permanent chaos,” as Doguwa cautioned; the first stage is to unite NASS; the next step is enforcement.
“Is Nigeria’s National Assembly finally waking up… or just rehearsing for the 2027 campaign cameras?”
